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The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the 
. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) issued reports on 
the future of financial reporting in response to criticisms of the current US and UK 
reporting models. The AICPA and ICAEW recommend that standard setters develop a 
model of business reporting to provide the following types of information: (a) forward-
looking information, (b) financial and nonfinancial data, and (c) management's analysis 
of financial and nonfinancial data. Management's analysis of financial and nonfinancial 
data allows users to develop a model of the firm's operations from management's 
perspective. Purportedly, management's identification and assessment of reasons for 
changes in the financial and operating performance of the firm enables users to assess 
whether past factors or trends will affect the firm's future operating performance; and 
forward-looking information about the firm's opportunities, risks, and plans enables 
users to assess where management intends to take the firm in the future. 
Under the current financial reporting model, many of these disclosures are 
provided at management's discretion. Discretionary disclosure research surmises that 
management's decision to disclose proprietary information rests on the perceived costs 
and benefits of the disclosure. Firms may benefit from increased disclosure by 
increasing analyst following, improving analyst forecast accuracy, reducing analyst 
uncertainty about a f~'s future earnings, decreasing firm risk, and ultimately reducing 
the cost of capital. 
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In recent years accounting researchers have attempted to link discretionary 
disclosures with improved user expectations and a reduction in the firm's cost of 
capital. For example, Botosan (1996), finds that discretionary disclosure reduces the 
cost of capital for small firms. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that the 
. "informativeness" of disclosure is related to increased forecast accuracy, as well as 
reduced risk and uncertainty. 1 Overall, there is limited empirical evidence identifying 
benefits of discretionary disclosure. This dissertation examines whether discretionary 
disclosures reduce analysts' forecast errors and reduce the level of disagreement among 
analysts. 
1.1 Research Objective 
The purpose of this dissertation is examine whether the level and/or precision of 
voluntary disclosures across US and UK cross-listed firms is related to forecast error 
and forecast dispersion. First, voluntary (discretionary) disclosures are compared across 
US and UK cross-listed firms. A priori, US firms may provide less discretionary 
disclosure, relative to UK firms, because of the rigid, detailed mandatory disclosures in 
the US [Gray, Radebaugh and Roberts 1990]. On the other hand, US firms may 
provide more discretionary disclosures, relative to UK firms, because of analysts' 
greater demand for information in the US [Frost and Pownall 1994]. Thus the first two 
research questions address whether discretionary disclosures differ across US and UK 
cross-listed firms. 
1 The informativeness of firms' disclosures is based on analysts' ratings of the disclosures. 
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The remaining research questions address whether differences in discretionary 
disclosures are related to differences in forecast error and dispersion across US and UK 
cross-listed firms. Prior research indicates that forecast error is significantly different 
across US and UK firms [Frankel and Lee 1996; Cho 1994]. O'Brien contends that 
. variation in forecast error may be explained by differences in the information 
disseminated by firms. Differences in forecast error and dispersion across US and UK 
firms may be due to the level and precisiorr of discretionary disclosures provided by 
US and UK firms. 
In summary, this dissertation extends the discretionary disclosure literature and 
examines the following research questions: (1) Do US and UK cross-listed firms 
provide different levels of discretionary disclosure? (2) Do discretionary disclosures by 
US and UK cross-listed firms differ in their degree of precision? (3) Do differences in 
the level and precision of voluntary disclosures explain the variation in forecast error 
and dispersion across US and UK firms? 
1.2 Importance of the Problem 
Financial analysts specialize in evaluating firm-specific and industry-specific 
information which enables them to assess firms' future performance. Regardless of its 
limitations, the primary source of information for analysts' forecasts is the annual 
report. As noted previously, financial reporting in the US and UK has been the subject 
of serious criticism. The AICPA and ICAEW reports address the limitations of the 
2 In this dissertation precision is defined as the extent to which management discloses business decisions 
and events that affect the item disclosed, as well as the consequences of those business decisions and 
events allocated over time. 
3 
current reporting model, and recommend increased discretionary disclosure as a means 
of improving financial reporting. Both reports specifically recommend that firms 
increase the level of disclosure, particularly disclosure of items that indicate the firm's 
current operating performance and project the firm's future operating performance. 
"- Additionally, the AICPA report recommends that firms disclose information about how 
the items disclosed are derived, particularly management's assessment of the business 
decisions and events that affect the item disclosed, as well as the consequences of those 
business decisions and events allocated over time. However, whether these types of 
disclosures improve analysts' forecasts is an empirical question. If discretionary 
disclosures explain differences in forecast error across US and UK cross-listed firms, 
and are related to reduced forecast error and dispersion for these firms, this result 
provides some empirical support for the AICPA and ICAEW proposition that increased 
discretionary disclosure reduces forecast error and forecast dispersion. 
The next section discusses models of discretionary disclosure presented in the 
literature. The models are discussed to identify factors that affect the discretionary 
disclosure decision. Also, prior studies that compare discretionary disclosures by US 




2. DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE 
Research on discretio11ary disclosure relevant to this dissertation can be 
. classified into three categories: 
(1) Positive theories of discretionary disclosure and the relationship between 
discretionary disclosure and expectations 
(2) Descriptive studies of US and UK discretionary disclosure levels and 
factors that affect a firm's discretionary disclosure policy 
(3) Studies of the effects of discretionary disclosure on analysts' expectations 
There are many discretionary disclosure models. The main classes of disclosure 
models are shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the first column includes models that 
present the disclosure decision in terms of the effect of disclosure on traders alone. 
The second column includes disclosure models that present the disclosure decision in 
terms of the effect of disclosure on investors, as well as other groups, e.g., analysts, 
rival firms, or bondholders. The rows of Figure 1 segregate the models based on 
assumptions about managers' disclosure objectives. For example, the first row refers 
to models in which managers seek to maximize the total wealth of all shareholders, i.e., 
the total wealth of current and potential shareholders [Walker 1997]. 
This dissertation focuses on the relationship between discretionary disclosure 
and analysts' forecasts. In terms of Figure 1, the disclosure models in category 4, 
where management's objective is to maximize the total wealth of shareholders, and the 
interests of third parties are considered in the discretionary disclosure decision, are 
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relevant to this study. As noted earlier, these models are discussed to identify factors 
that affect the level and precision of discretionary disclosures. A priori expectations 
about the level and precision of discretionary disclosures across US and UK cross-listed 
firms and the potential effect of these disclosures are posited based on the discretionary 
. disclosure models discussed in the next section. 
2.1. Positive Theories of Discretionary Disclosure and the Relationship between 
Discretionary Disclosure and Expectations 
Verrecchia (1983) contends that when the receipt of information is certain and 
the level of precision is determined by firms, more precise information implies a lower 
minimum level of disclosure and a greater probability of disclosure. Verrecchia's 
model establishes the existence of a discretionary disclosure equilibrium. He posits that 
the equilibrium level of disclosure depends on the following three conditions: (1) firms 
seek to maximize their stock price; (2) users make correct conjectures whenever a firm 
withholds information; and (3) the more information departs from what is expected, the 
greater the proprietary cost associated with its disclosure. Verrecchia concludes that 
discretionary disclosure will decrease as the cost of disclosing the information 
increases. 
In essence, Verrecchia finds that the equilibrium level of discretionary 
disclosure depends on the firm's objective to maximize its stock price, users' 
speculations about the firms' reasons for withholding information, and the cost of 
additional disclosure. Thus the equilibrium level of disclosure in all likelihood will 
differ across US and UK cross-listed firms depending on the firms' objectives and other 
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equilibrium conditions. Verrecchia's model supports the notion that considerabl~ 
diversity is expected among firms and across the US and UK firms. 
Sankar (1993) focuses on the cost of discretionary disclosure and models the 
discretionary disclosure decision in a competitive market setting. He suggests that the 
. discretionary disclosure decision is determined by the reaction of rival firms to the 
information disclosed. In his model the receipt of information is uncertain, such that 
nondisclosure may be due to the lack of information, rather than the nondisclosure of 
bad news. Since nondisclosure may be perceived as the result of a lack of information, 
nondisclosure is discounted less heavily and ultimately firms disclose less valuable or 
less precise information. This result suggests that the competitive disadvantage of 
disclosing proprietary data differs across industries and therefore disclosure levels are 
likely to differ across product markets. Thus discretionary disclosures by US and UK 
cross-listed firms in different industries may differ because of differences in the level of 
competition across product markets. 
Penno (1996) presents a model of management's disclosure precision choice. 
He contends that management makes its precision choice to manipulate users' 
conditional expectations. Similar to this dissertation, Penno defines disclosure 
precisioB as the extent to which firms discuss how the amounts disclosed are derived 
[Penno 1996, p .141]. He finds a unique equilibrium in which firms will provide more 
precise disclosures if the firm's future prospects are unfavorable, and less precise 
disclosures if the firm's future prospects are favorable. Given Penno'.s scenario in 
which disclosure precision is intended to manipulate users' expectations, the 
relationship between disclosure precision and analysts' forecast error and dispersion is 
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ambiguous. This study examines whether more precise discretionary disclosure is 
related to reduced forecast error and dispersion. 
Diamond (1985) provides a model of discretionary disclosure incentives or 
benefits. Assuming constant absolute risk aversion preferences among users, he 
· contends that the disclosure of proprietary data reduces private information acquisition, 
and improves risk sharing by reducing the level of dispersion among users' beliefs. He 
conjectures that when discretionary disclosure is of sufficient quality, the incentive to 
acquire additional information decreases. A reduction in private information 
acquisition reduces the disparity in the information sets of users and the level of 
disagreement among users' beliefs. Therefore, if firms provide information of 
sufficient quality or precision, analysts may be less likely to seek information from 
other sources and thereby reduce the disparity among their information sets . 
. Presumably analysts' beliefs are more homogenous when their forecasts are based on 
similar information sets. Assuming the concept of disclosure precision used in this 
study· represents an element of disclosure quality, this study examines whether · 
increased discretionary· disclosure precision is related to reduced forecast dispersion. 
In summary, positive disclosure theories identify firm-specific factors that 
determine the level and precision of discretionary disclosures. Verrecchia (1983) 
contends that firms' capital market concerns, (i.e., firms' objective to maximize their 
stock price, users' speculation as to management's motivation for withholding 
information, and the cost of discretionary disclosure) determine the equilibrium level of 
discretionary disclosures. The equilibrium level of disclosure implies that the 
discretionary disclosure choice is jointly determined by the firm's objectives and users 
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information requirements. Sankar (1993) contends product firms' product market 
concerns, (i.e., the reaction of rival firms to the information disclosed), determine the 
level and precision of discretionary disclosures. To the extent that financing and 
product market concerns differ across the US and UK firms in this study, discretionary 
. disclosure is expected to differ across the two Sf11llples. 
Based on Diamond (1985), discretionary disclosure precision is expected to 
reduce forecast dispersion for both the US and UK firms in the study. Differences in 
dispersion across the US and UK firms may be due to differences in the precision of the 
discretionary disclosures provided by the US and UK firms. In light of Penno (1996), 
the relationship between discretionary disclosure and forecast error is ambiguous; and 
whether discretionary disclosure is related to differences in forecast error across the US 
and UK is an empirical issue. 
2.2 US and UK Discretionary Disclosure 
Gray, Meek, and Roberts (1995) describe the voluntary disclosures made by US 
and UK multinational firms and classify the disclosures into three major categories: 
(1) strategic, (2) nonfmancial, and (3) financial [GMR 1995]. A voluntary disclosure is 
defined as a disclosure that is voluntary for both the US and UK firms. 
GMR (1995) find that firm size, country/region, and international listing status . 
are dominant factors that explain the variation in voluntary disclosure levels. 
Furthermore, the importance of the factors varies by information type. Large firms, 
particularly in the UK, tend to disclose more nonfmancial and fmancial information. 
Internationally listed firms tend to disclose more strategic information than firms that 
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are listed only in their domestic market. Overall, nonfinancial and financial 
information are the most commonly disclosed information types. Like GRM (1995), 
this defines discretionary (voluntary) disclosures as disclosures provided beyond those 
required in both the US and UK; and as suggested by GMR (1995), cross-listed firms, 
. (i.e.,US and UK firms listed in both the US and UK), are examined in this study to 
control for differences in discretionary disclosures due to listing status. 
Frost and Pownall (1994) find that US firms provide significantly more 
voluntary disclosures (including management forecasts) than UK firms and they posit 
that the greater analysts' demand for information in the US explains the difference in 
discretionary disclosures. However, cross-listed US and UK firms must meet the 
information demands of both US and UK analysts. Therefore it is not clear that Frost 
and Pownall (1994) results can be attributed to the reason they provide. 
Collins, Davie, and Weetman (1993) compare the "quality" of discretionary 
disclosures across US domiciled firms and UK internationally listed firms. 
Discretionary disclosures in the Operating and Financial Review section of the UK 
annual report and the Management Discussion and Analysis section of the US annual 
report are examined. Disclosure "quality" is measured as the number of forward-
looking disclosures. While they find that UK firms provide higher quality discretionary 
disclosures than the US firms, the empirical design of CDW (1993) demonstrates the 
importance of controlling for listing status when comparing discretionary disclosures 
across countries. Also, information quality as defined by CDW (1993) is fairly 
narrow. Quality should encompass more than the number of forward-looking 
disclosures. The disclosure precision measure used in this study may be viewed as an 
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aspect of disclosure quality. Therefore, the definition of disclosure quality in this study 
includes both forward-looking discretionary disclosures, along with other types of 
discretionary disclosures, and the precision of these disclosures. 
2.3 Analysts' Forecasts and Information 
There has been little empirical research that relates the quality of 
discretionary disclosure to analysts' expectations. Lang and Lundholm (1996) use data 
from the Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee 
(FAF Report 1985-89), and its measure of disclosure informativeness to examine the 
relationship between disclosure informativeness and analyst following, forecast 
accuracy, and volatility in forecast revisions. The F AF measures informativeness as 
"the extent to which the firm provides information so that investors have the 
information necessary to make informed judgements." Lang and Lundholm (1996) use 
analysts' ratings of disclosures as a measure of informativeness. However, they 
provide no insight as to the criteria analysts use to evaluate the disclosures. Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) conclude that US firms with more informative disclosure policies 
have a larger analyst following, more accurate analysts' earnings forecasts, less 
dispersion among individual analysts' forecasts, and less volatility in forecast revisions. 
Given the notion that disclosure precision, as defined in this study, represents an 
element of disclosure informativeness, this study examines whether disclosure precision 
is related to differences in forecast error and dispersion across the US and UK cross-
listed firms included in the sample. 
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Cho (1994) compares forecast error across US and UK domiciled firms. Using 
the number of analysts following the firm as a proxy for information availability, Cho 
finds that the source of variation in forecast error across US and UK firms is 
information availability. As information about UK firms increases, forecast errors for 
. UK firms decreases. However, information availability is not related to forecast errors 
of US firms. This result may suggest that the analyst following is an inadequate proxy 
for information availability in the US. This result may also suggest that information 
disseminated by US and UK firms differs, and/ or that the relationship between 
information and forecast errors may be different across US and UK firms. This 
dissertation addresses whether differences in discretionary disclosures explain 
differences in forecast error and dispersion across US and UK cross-listed firms. 
In summary, prior studies examine and compare the level of discretionary 
disclosures across US and UK firms, and identify factors that affect the variation in 
discretionary disclosure among and across US and UK firms. Few studies examine the 
relative quality of discretionary disclosure between the US and UK. This dissertation 
. measures and compares the level and precision of discretionary disclosures provided by 
US and UK cross-listed firms, and examines the relationship between discretionary 
disclosure and analysts' forecast error (dispersion). 
The next section presents a model of factors that affect forecast error and 
dispersion. The factors included in the model have been identified in the literature as 
determinants of forecast. error and dispersion. 
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CHAPTER III 
3. FORECASTING FRAMEWORK 
Chapter III presents a discussion of firm-specific factors and macroeconomic 
. factors that may affect forecast error and dispersion. The objective of this analysis is to 
present a model of factors that may affect analysts' forecasts, and ultimately affect 
analysts' forecast error and dispersion. The last section presents a functional model of 
forecast error and dispersion. 
3.1 Firm-Specific Factors 
Studies that examine forecast error and dispersion consistently find that firm 
size is negatively related to forecast error and dispersion [Brown et. al (1987); Cho 
(1994); Bhushan (1989)]. As stated previously, Cho (1994) compares the determinants 
of forecast error across US and UK firms. For both the US and UK samples, firm size 
is negatively related to forecast error. Analysts may focus on larger firms because they 
are more widely held and stimulate the interest of a large number of investors, and 
ultimatley result in more business transactions for the analysts [Bhushan 1989]. 
Forecast error may also be affected by the volatility in firms' earnings streams. 
Kross, Ro, and Schroeder (1990) find that earnings volatility is positively correlated 
with forecast error. Varying levels of competition and risk among industries suggest 
differences in earnings predictability across firms in different industries. For example, 
the earnings of regulated industries may be less volatile and therefore more predictable 
[Cho 1994]. Furthermore, there may be important industry differences across firms in 
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terms of the demand for analysts' services. For example, information acquisition costs 
may differ by industry, implying that, ceteris paribus, there will be differences in the 
number of analysts forecasting in different industries, and ultimately differences in 
forecast error and dispersion [Bhushan 1989]. 
Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985) compare forecast error across forecast 
horizons. They find that the forecast horizon, (i.e., the length of time between the date 
the forecast is made and the fiscal year end), affects forecast error and dispersion. The 
intuition is that more information becomes available as fiscal year end approaches. 
Consequently, forecast error and dispersion decrease over time. 
Additionally, forecast error may differ across firms from different domiciles 
because of accounting measurement techniques used to compute earnings. Prior 
research suggests that firms use accounting techniques to "smooth'' earnings and 
thereby reduce perceived risk and the volatility in their stock prices. Appendix A 
summarizes significant differences in US and UK GAAP measurement techniques, with 
the relative impact of the techniques on earnings expressed in terms of conservatism. 
Most of the GAAP differences result in more conservative earnings figures under US 
GAAP. Also, for each of the differences between US and UK GAAP, UK GAAP 
allows more flexibility in the application of the accounting rules [Radebaugh and Gray 
1993]. For example, US accounting rules for the amortization of goodwill tend to be 
more restrictive than those in the UK. In particular, goodwill is capitalized and 
amortized over a period not to exceed 40 years in the US. In the UK, firms may 
capitalize and amortize goodwill over its economic useful life, but there is no maximum 
14 
period of amortization. Alternatively, UK firms may write-off goodwill to equity in the 
year of acquisition [Radebaugh and Gray 1993]. 
Unanticipated changes in economic activity may affect analyst forecast error and 
dispersion [O'Brien 1988]. The next section discusses economic factors used in analyst 
. forecast models to predict earnings. 
3.2 Macroeconomic Factors 
The macroeconomic factors used to predict earnings include gross national 
product (GNP), inflation, and exchange rates [Herrmann 1996]. Expectations of these 
factors are used to predict the firm's future profitability in light of the firm's economic 
environment. 
3.2.1 Gross National Product 
Gross National Product (GNP) in the US and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
the UK represent the market value of the aggregate production of new goods and 
services [Smith 1985]. Expectations of changes in national economic growth are 
presumed to be directly correlated with changes in firm profitability. Presumably 
analysts use the expected growth in the national economy as an indicator of future 
earnings growth of firms within the economy. 
3.2.2 Inflation 
Inflation reflects changes in the price of goods and services. In the long run, 
price changes are due to shifts in the country's aggregate demand and supply curves 
caused by monetary policy, fiscal policy, or private acquisitions. In the short run, 
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prices are set in individual markets by contracts, regulatory authorities, and pricing 
. formulas. For example, from these pricing formulas, firms determine their average 
costs at normal production levels and set product prices to earn a target profit. 
Ultimately, economic fluctuations, e.g., changes in demand and supply conditions, 
. affect firms' profits through changes in the costs of wages and other expenses. 
3.2.3 Exchange Rates 
Exchange rates determine the domestic price· of foreign goods. Inflation in one 
country depreciates its currency relative to another country's currency, ceteris paribus. 
Smith (1985) states that exchange rates adjust to maintain purchasing power parity 
across countries. In other words, exchange rates change such that the price of a foreign 
item will equal the domestic price of a comparable domestic item. If purchasing power 
parity holds, changes in exchange rates are negatively correlated with changes in 
inflation. Empirical research indicates that purchasing power parity does not hold in 
the short-run. Therefore forecast models of one-year-ahead earnings should include 
both expected changes in exchange rates and inflation [Abuaf and Jorion 1990]. 
Balakrishnan, Harris, and Sen (1990) and Herrmann (1996) describe the 
accuracy of earnings expectations as a function of changes in the aforementioned 
macroeconomic factors. The model is described as follows 
where 
the expected amount of earnings in period t + 1: 
the actual earnings in period t. 
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= the expected change in the effective exchange rate in period 
t + 1. 
E [MNF,+ 1] 
E [~GNP,+ 1] = 
the expected change in inflation in period t + 1. 
the expected change in real GNP in period t + 1. 
The model depicts the main effects of each economic factor and interactions 
between the factors. Presumably, errors in expected economic changes will result in 
larger earnings forecast errors. 
O'Brien (1988) models forecast error as a combination of average error across 
firms and across time periods. Forecast error is described below as 
IF E. ' I = o1 . + o2 . + e. ' h J J h (2) 
where 
o., . ,J average error across years for each firm j. 
average error across firms for each year t 
deviations from the average error for firm.j and for year t 
In this study, forecast error is computed across firms and time periods. Firm-
specific factors, particularly the level of discretionary disclosure, may result in 
differences in forecast error and dispersion across firms and countries. 
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3.4 Forecasting Models 
The preceding paragraphs discuss predictive factors used to forecast earnings, 
and factors that affect forecast error and dispersion. Based on these factors, a structural 
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I Fi' r - Ai,, I I I Ai,, I , where ~-' is actual earnings per share 
for firm j, for period t and I:;., is forecast earnings per share 
for firm j in period t 
forecast dispersion for firmj in period t 
disclosure level score for firm in period t-1 
the disclosure precision score for firmj in period t-1 
market equity (shares * price for firmj in period) 
industry classification for firm j in period t 
historical earnings stability for firm.j, over period t-1 to t-5 
forecast horizon, i.e., t - i months prior to fiscal year end 
1 if US cross-listed firm, 0 if UK cross-listed firm 





the expected change in the effective exchange rate in period 
t + 1 
the expected change in inflation in period t + 1 
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CHAPTER IV 
4. STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Discretionary disclosure levels across US and UK cross-listed 
firms 
The first research question addresses whether US and UK cross-listed firms 
provide different levels of discretionary disclosures. As noted in Meek, Gray, and 
Roberts (1995), country of origin, which may indicate the influence of domestic 
mandatory disclosures on firms' discretionary disclosure strategies, explains some of 
the variation in discretionary disclosures by US and UK firms. Gray, Radebaugh, and 
Roberts (1990) contend that US firms will provide less information voluntarily than UK 
firms because of the extensive regulatory disclosure requirements in the US. However, 
Frost, and Pownall (1994) note that US firms provide more discretionary disclosures to 
meet US analysts' greater demand for information. In this study, cross-listed firms are 
examined to control for the effect of international listing status on the level of 
discretionary disclosure [Gray, Meek, and Roberts 1995]. The demand for information 
should be similar for these firms. 
Based on this discussion, the first hypothesis addresses whether the level of 
discretionary disclosure differs across US and UK cross-listed firms. The first 
hypothesis is stated below in the null and alternative forms. 
Hl0: The level of discretionary disclosure is equal across US and UK cross-
listed firms. 
HlA: The level of discretionary disclosure is not equal across US and UK 
cross-listed firms. 
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4.2 Hypothesis 2: Discretionary disclosure precision across US and UK cross-
listed firms 
Discretionary disclosure theory contends that the precision of discretionary 
disclosure is a function of product market and capital market concerns. Firms that 
operate in highly competitive industries are less likely to disclose high quality 
proprietary information voluntarily than firms that do not face similar competitive 
pressures [Sankar 1993; Bhushan 1989]. Also, firms seeking to obtain new capital are 
more likely to disclose additional information voluntarily than firms that do not have 
immediate capital concerns [Lang and Lundholm 1993]. Thus differences in the 
precision of discretionary disclosures by US and UK firms represented in this study 
may be due to differences in product market concerns since they are concentrated in 
different industries, facing different competitive pressures.3 The extent to which capital 
market pressures are different across the US and UK will affect the precision of the 
sample firms' discretionary disclosures. 
The second research question addresses whether discretionary disclosure 
precision differs across US and UK cross-listed firms. The second hypothesis is stated 
below in the null and alternative forms. 
H20: The precision of discretionary disclosure is equal across US and UK 
cross-listed firms. 
H2A: The precision of discretionary disclosure is not equal across US and UK 
cross-listed firms. 
3 Table 2, discussed in Chapter V, shows the industry representation of the sampled US and UK firms. 
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4.3 Hypothesis 3: Discretionary Disclosure and Forecast Accuracy across US and 
UK firms 
Frankel and Lee (1997) compare forecast error across countries and find 
significant differences in forecast error across US and UK firms. Cho (1994) compares 
the determinants of forecast error across US and UK firms and finds significant 
differences after controlling for firm size and industry effects. The difference in 
forecast error across the US and UK firms is attributed to the number of analysts 
following the firms. Since analyst following is a function of information availability,4 
this result suggests that differences in forecast error across the US and UK may be due, 
at least in part, to the level and quality of discretionary information disclosed by US 
and UK firms. 
The third research question addresses whether differences in forecast error 
across US and UK cross-listed firms is due to differences in the level and precision of 
discretionary disclosure. The third hypothesis is stated below in the null and alternative 
forms: 
H30: The level and/or precision of discretionary disclosure is not related to 
differences in forecast error across US and UK cross-listed firms. 
IDA: The level and/or precision of discretionary disclosure is related to 
forecast error across US .and UK cross-listed firms. 
4.4 Hypothesis 4: Discretionary Disclosure and Forecast Dispersion 
Diamond (1985) presents an economic model of the benefits of discretionary 
disclosure. He posits that increased discretionary disclosure reduces the level of private 
4 Bhushan 1989 examines the determinants of the number of analysts following a firm. Firm size, 
ownership structure, and information are related to the number of analysts following a firm. 
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information acquisition and reduces dispersion among users' beliefs. Similarly, Barry 
and Brown (1985) support the notion that beliefs among analysts tend to converge as 
the level of public information increases. Blackwell and Dubins (1962) statistically 
demonstrate that as individuals obtain finite information items, each individual has a 
. basis for better probability beliefs and the variation of their beliefs decreases. If 
discretionary disclosures differ across the US and· UK cross-listed firms in this study, 
assuming all other factors are constant, differences in forecast dispersion across the US 
and UK firms may be related to differences in discretionary disclosures. 
The fourth research question addresses whether discretionary disclosure i~ 
related to differences in forecast dispersion across the US and· UK cross-listed firms. 
The fourth hypothesis is stated below in the null and alternative forms. 
H40: The level and/or precision of discretionary disclosures by US and UK 
cross-listed firms is not related to the difference in forecast dispersion 
across US and UK cross-listed firms. 
H4A: The level and/or precision of discretionary disclosures by US and UK 
cross-listed firms is related to differences in forecast dispersion across 
US and UK cross-listed firms. 
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CHAPTERV 
5~ RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Data 
The data collection begins with a list of cross-listed firms from the 1994 
International Stock Exchange. Earnings forecasts are obtained from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (1/B/E/S). Firms included in the sample meet the following 
data constraints: 
(1) The firms are listed on both the International Stock Exchange and either 
the American Stock Exchange or the New York Stock Exchange. 
(2) Actual earnings figures are available on 1/B/E/S to ensure consistency and 
comparability in the earnings per share figures used to compute forecast 
error and dispersion. Also, earnings forecast data and five year earnings 
stability data are available on 1/B/E/S. 
(3) Annual report data is available for 1993 and/or 1995 to measure the level 
and precision of discretionary disclosure across firms and years. 
(4) No financial institutions are included in the sample because of the 
specialized financial reporting for financial institutions. 
(5) No stock splits occurred between 1993 and 1995 to limit the number of 
adjustments to the 1/B/E/S forecast data. 
Table 1 presents the number of firms included in the sample. 
5.2 Discretionary Disclosure Index 
The first two research questions address whether discretionary disclosures 
provided by US and UK cross-listed firms are significantly different. A disclosure 
index based on the AICPA and ICAEW recommendations, Meek, Gray, and Roberts 
(1995) and Botosan (1997) is developed to measure the level of discretionary disclosure 
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across US and UK firms. The disclosures are divided into four categories: (1) 
background information, (2) financial and nonfinancial data, (3) information in the 
management discussion and analysis section, and (4) forward-looking information. 
Appendix B contains the disclosure index. A precision index, which is discussed later, 
. is developed to measure disclosure precision. 
5.2.1 Background Information 
Background information includes broad company objectives and strategies, a 
description of the business and properties, and the impact of the industry structure on 
the company. Management objectives and strategies provide a forward-looking 
perspective about where management intends to take the company in the future. Given 
this information, analysts can assess the firm's ability to meet its objectives and 
evaluate the firm's strategy. The scope and description of business and properties, 
particularly changes in the business and properties, enable analysts to maintain a 
current mental image of the company's current operations and future prospects. 
Information about the impact of industry structure addresses new products or services 
that affect the market served by the business. For example, information about 
technological and regulatory changes that may affect a firm's market and information 
about the intensity of competition in an industry is useful to analysts. Analysts may use 
this information to evaluate opportunities and risks and the impact of these 
opportunities and risks on a firm's operating performance. 
25 
5.2.2 Financial and Nonfinancial Data 
The AICPA's report notes that users are as interested in a firm's business 
activities, processes, and events that affect the firm, as they are interested in its 
financial measures. Operating data allows analysts to model company revenues and 
.costs both in operating terms, e.g., units sold, key resources consumed, number of 
employees, and employee wages, as well as in financial terms. Operating performance 
measurements and disclosures that relate to the quality of products or services, the 
relative cost of activities, and the time required to develop new products are useful 
indicators of a firm's current performance and future earnings potential. 
5.2.3 Management Discussion and Analysis 
The US Management Discussion and Analysis, and the UK Operating and 
Financial Review are intended to convey year-to-year changes in the firm's financial 
performance, not covered in the basic financial statements. SEC Act Release No. 6231 
requires "a discussion of liquidity, capital resources, results of operations, and other 
information necessary to an understanding of a registrant's financial condition and 
results of operations" [FRR-36, p.1577 1989]. Since the SEC guidelines do not 
explid.tly require quantitative disclosures, such disclosures are included in both the 
discretionary disclosure level measure and the precision measure. 
5.2.4 Forward-looking Information 
Forward-looking information includes information about opportunities and 
risks, and management's plans for the future. Industry conditions, threats from 
substitute products or services, and changes in the competitive environment represent 
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opportunities and risks. Management's plans for the future include key assumptions 
about factors or conditions that are critical for management's plans to be successful. 
Analysts use this information to assess the validity of the firm's projections and the 
likelihood· the firm will achieve its objectives. 
5.3 Measuring Discretionary Disclosure 
Two measures of disclosure are developed: (1) a measure of the level of 
discretionary disclosure in the annual report, and (2) a measure of the precision of 
discretionary disclosure in the annual report. Using dichotomous scoring, summing the 
total number of points awarded to firm j across all 68 items in the index produces a 
measure of disclosure level (VDS) for each firm for period t. Operationally, disclosure 
level is computed as: 
n=68 
VDS.,=" SCORE .. , J, L.J l,J, (5) 
i=I 
The second measure of voluntary disclosure augments the level measure by 
incorporating the concept of precision. Disclosure precision (PVDS) is defined as 
follows: (1) the extent to which the item disclosed is quantified; (2) the extent to which 
business.decisions and events that affect the item disclosed are discussed and quantified; 
and (3) the extent to which the consequences of the business decisions and events that 
affect the item disclosed are discussed, quantified, and allocated over time. 
Specifically, the precision score is intended to measure the extent to which firms do the 
following: (1) quantify the item disclosed, i.e., provide a range of values or point 
estimate; (2) disclose the change in the item disclosed; (3) discuss reasons for the item 
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disclosed; (4) quantify reasons for the item disclosed; (5) discuss transitory and/or 
permanent effects of the item disclosed; and (6) quantify transitory and/or permanent 
effects of the item disclosed. Each of the 68 items in the discretionary disclosure index 
is evaluated based on the criteria in the precision index and awarded a precision score . 
. For example, a maximum of one points is awarded if the firm quantifies the item 
disclosed, i.e., one-half point is awarded for disclosing range estimates and one point is 
awarded for disclosing point estimates. One point each is awarded for: disclosure of 
the change in the item disclosed, discussion of the reasons for the item disclosed, 
quantification of reasons for the item disclosed, discussion of the transitory or 
permanent effects of the item disclosed, and quantification of the transitory or 
permanent effects of the item disclosed. Appendix C lists the items in the precision 
index. Total precision is computed as: 
. 68 
PVDSJ,t= LPSCOREi,j,t (6) 
i=I 
Where (PVDS) is the precision score for firm.j for period t. 
The following example is provided to illustrate the scoring procedure. Philip 
Morris's 1995 annual report discusses the firm's projected capital expenditures for 1996 
as follows: 
"Capital expenditures are estimated to be $1.8 billion in 1996 and a total 
of approximately $8.0 billion for the five-year period 1996-2000, of 
which approximately 41 % and 46 % , respectively, are projected for food 
·operations and approximately 53 % and 44 % , respectively, are projected 
for tobacco operations." [Philip Morris 1995, p.24] 
The capital expenditure forecast is awarded a precision score of 3 out of 6. One point 
is awarded for the point estimate; one point is awarded for disclosing the reason for the 
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business decisions that affect the, capital expenditure forecast, i.e., expenditures for 
food and tobacco operations; and one point is awarded for the quantification of the 
reasons for the business decisions that affect the capital expenditure, i.e., 41 % and 53 % 
are projected for food operations and tobacco operations. (The five year expenditure 
. forecast is not included in the precision score because this study focuses on one-year-
ahead forecasts). Since Philip Morris does not disclose changes in capital expenditures 
nor discuss or quantify transitory or permanent affects on capital expenditures, no 
points are for them. 
5.4 Comparing Discretionary Disclosure Across US and UK Cross-listed Firms 
The first two research questions address whether discretionary disclosures differ 
across US and UK firms. To test hypotheses one and two, discretionary disclosure data 
are collected from the annual reports of US and UK cross-listed firms. In total, 97 US 
annual reports and 96 UK annual reports are analyzed. The US and UK samples each 
include 71 firms. The disclosure measures are based on annual report data for the 
years 1993, 1995, or both. Prior research on disclosure levels use disclosure ranks 
rather than the actual scores because of violations of normality and ambiguity associated 
with the measurement scale of the disclosure scores. To achieve an interval scale of 
measurement, the disclosure items are assumed to be equally weighted, i.e., the items 
are equally important to analysts' forecasts. Also, normality tests of the disclosure 
scores indicate that the scores are normally distributed. Therefore, actual scores and 
parametric t-tests are used to test for mean differences in disclosure between the US and 
the UK firms in the sample. 
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5.5 Testing the Relationship between Discretionary Disclosure Forecast Error 
The third research question addresses whether forecast error across US and UK 
cross-listed firms is related to the level and/or precision of discretionary disclosures. 
Firm-specific factors, (i.e., earnings stability, firm size and industry classification) are 
. included in the model to control for their affects on forecast error [O'Brien 1988; 
Brown et. al 1987; Cho 1994; Kross, Ro, and Schroeder 1990]. 
Earnings stability is measured as the mean absolute percentage difference 
between actual reported earnings per share and a five-year historical earnings per share 
growth trend line, expressed as a percentage of the trend line EPS. Earnings stability is 
expected to be positively correlated with forecast error and forecast dispersion. 1/B/E/S 
calculates earnings stability as follows: 
where 
n 
Stabili~,, = ~]Earning.(x, )-Trend(x, )j + jTrend(x, )I+ 5 
l=l 
Earnings (x,) = 
Trend (x,) = 
actual earnings for firm j in period t 
earnings trend line, a*eb*x , i.e., the slope of a 
least squares curve fit to the logarithm of the 
reported earnings 
(7) 
Earnings stability measures the uniformity of earnings per share growth for firm j over 
the past five years. The lower the number, the more uniform earnings growth has 
been. This measure of earnings stability is taken from the 1/B/E/S forecast data. 
Earnings stability is used in this dissertation to control for the variation in forecast error 
and dispersion among firms that can be attributed to the volatility of the earnings 
30 
stream. Also, earnings stability is used to proxy for differences in US and UK GAAP 
measurement practices when comparing forecast error and dispersion across the US and 
UK firms in the sample. 
Market capitalization is used as a measure of firm size. Market capitalization 
. represents the total value of the firm's outstanding equity. Market capitalization for the 
UK firms is translated into US dollars using the exchange rate corresponding to the 
time of the price data. Firm size is expected to be negatively related to forecast error 
and dispersion. 
Industry classifications are based on 1/B/E/S sector codes. The firms are 
grouped into 11 industries. Table 2 presents the industry sectors included in the 
sample. 
Research discussed in Chapter ID indicates that analysts consider macroe-
conomic forecasts in developing their earnings forecasts. These factors should be 
included as control variables in models of forecast error and dispersion. However, it is 
not possible to include all of the economic predictor variables because the forecast 
models are estimated using two years of data. At least four years of data are required 
to estimate the model with three economic predictor variables. 
To assess the implications of this data constraint for this particular study, the 
relationship between expected changes and actual changes in the economic factors and 
actual earnings changes is examined. Appendix D describes the procedure used to 
analyze these relationships. The results indicate that actual and expected changes in 
economic factors are not related to earnings changes for the data used in this study. 
31 
The following general linear model is used to test the effect of discretionary 
disclosure on forecast error across US and UK cross-listed firms. 
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earnings per share for firm j, for period t and I), , is forecast 
earnings per share for firm j in period t. 
actual earnings per share for firm j in period t 
mean analyst forecast of period t earnings per share for firm 
j 
the disclosure level score for firmj in period t-1 
the disclosure precision score for firmj in period t-1 
historical earnings stability for firmj, over period t-1 to t-5 
Sizei,t = market capitalization, i.e., shares outstanding * Price for 
firmj in period t 
Countryi = 
Ind . . 1 l,J, 
Hor .. ,, l,J = 
Year, 
indicator variable, i.e., 0 if UK cross-listed firm, 1 if US 
cross-listed firm 
industry classification for firm j in period t representing 
industry category i, i = 1, ... , 1 
indicator variable for firm j in period t, representing month 
i, i = 0, ... , -11, i.e., the number of months the forecast is 
made prior to the fiscal year end 
indicator variable, i.e., 0 if 1993, 1 if 1995 
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Forecast error is computed using actual earnings per share and expected earnings per 
share data from 1/B/E/S. 5 
Forecast error is measured as the absolute percentage difference in 
forecasted earnings per share for period t and actual earnings per share in period t . 
. Evidence of whether differences in discretionary disclosure level and precision explain 
differences in forecast error across the US and UK firms is found by noting the 
significance of the estimated slope parameters in Equation (8). The standard F-test is 
used to test the significance of the relationship between forecast error and discretionary 
disclosure for the US and UK firms. If the estimated coefficients on Country i * 
VDS i,t-z and Country i * PVDS i,t-z are significant, then the level and precision of 
discretionary disclosure explain differences in forecast error across the US and UK 
firms in the sample and null hypothesis three is rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis. Discretionary disclosure is expected to be negatively related to forecast 
error (i.e., forecast error decreases as the level and precision of discretionary disclosure 
increases). 
5.6 Testing the Relationship between Discretionary Disclosure and Forecast 
Dispersion 
The fourth research question addresses whether variation in forecast dispersion 
across US and UK cross-listed firms is related to discretionary disclosures provided by 
US and UK cross-listed firms. Forecast dispersion is used as a measure of the level of 
s EPS data are based on operating income divided by the weighted average number of common shares 
outstanding. To preserve the historical relationship between analysts' forecasts and reported earnings, 
no adjustments are made for restatement of earnings from a prior period. 
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disagreement among analysts' forecasts. Again, firm-specific factors that affect 
forecast dispersion are included in the forecast dispersion model. 
The level of disagreement among analysts is measured by the mean absolute 
coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation ( CV) is defined as the absolute 
. value of the standard deviation of the estimates expressed as a percent of the mean 
estimate. CV measures the relative dispersion of forecasts around the consensus 
estimate. A low CV indicates a high level of agreement among analysts. Conversely, a 





coefficient of variation for firm j in period t 
12 month forward standard deviation for firmj in period t 
12 month forward mean for firmj in period t 
(9) 
CV is computed from I/B/E/S data. This measure of differing beliefs ( CV) is 
used extensively in the literature as a proxy for forecast uncertainty.6 The general 
linear model used to test for differences across US and UK firms is described below. 
II -11 
lnCT:J1 = Go + P,.VD~1_1 + P,_PVD~-1 + A lnEar9.1 + A lnSizq,, + /JsCountr}* L4In4j., + Lf;HOfj1 + 
i=I j:(J 
{36 Year+ P,Count'}* VD~,-1 + flaCount'}* PVD~_1 + P,pount'}* lnEa~1 + AiPount'}* lnSizq,, (10) 
II -II 
APount'}* Io/nqj,I + A.J:ount'}* Lf;HOfj, + APount'}* Year+& 
i=I /=O 
6 For example, Daley, Senkow, and Vigeland [1988]; Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift [1991]; and Elliott, 
Philbrick, and Wiedman [1995] 
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where: 
= coefficient of variation for firm j in period t 
and all other variables are as previously defined. 
Evidence of whether discretionary disclosure level and precision is related to 
variation in forecast dispersion across the US and UK firms is found by noting the 
significance of the estimated slope parameters in equation (10). The standard F-test is 
used to test the whether forecast dispersion across US and UK cross-listed firms is 
related to discretionary disclosures provided by US and UK firms cross-listed firms. If 
the estimated coefficients on Country i * VDS i,t-J and Country i * PVDS i,t-J are 
significant, then the level and precision of discretionary disclosure explain differences 
in forecast dispersion across the US and UK firms in the sample, and null hypothesis 
four is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Discretionary disclosure is 
expected to be negatively related to forecast dispersion, i.e., the level of disagreement 




6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Test of Hypotheses 1 and 2: Differences in Discretionary Disclosure 
The first two research questions address whether discretionary disclosure differs 
across US and UK cross-listed firms. Table 3 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the disclosure scores for the US firms and the UK firms. Both the level 
and precision of discretionary disclosure by UK firms are significantly less than US 
firms at the a = .000 level. Table 4 presents the mean and standard deviation of the 
disclosure scores for the years 1993 and 1995. The test of mean differences in 
disclosure for the years 1993 and 1995 indicate significant differences across the years, 
with increased disclosure in 1995 compared to 1993 for both the US and UK firms in 
the sample. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The correlation matrices for the independent variables used in the US and UK 
forecast error models are shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Disclosure level 
(VOS) and disclosure precision (PVDS) are highly correlated at .843 («=.000) for the 
US data and at .641 («=.000) for the UK data. Most of the other correlations are less 
than .20 and significant at the .000 level. Tables 7 and 8 present the correlation 
statistics for the forecast dispersion models. The results are similar to the forecast error 
model results, with disclosure level positively correlated to disclosure precision. 
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6.2.1 Diagnostics 
Equations (8) and (10) presented in Chapter V are used to estimate the 
parameters and test hypotheses 3 and 4. Standard tests of the normality of the error 
terms using the untransformed variables indicated violation of the normality 
. assumption; therefore, the logarithmic transformation of the dependent variables and 
two of the independent variables (Size and Earnings Stability) is chosen. Standard tests 
of normality with the transformed variables failed to reject the normality assumption. 
As a result of the high correlation between the disclosure measures, 
multicollinearity diagnostics are performed. Variance inflation factors of less than 5 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a significant problem. To further support including 
both disclosure measures in the model, the models are tested for parameter stability, 
i.e., the models are run separately, each including only one of the disclosure measures. 
The estimated coefficients when the model is estimated with one of the disclosure 
variables are the same as when both variables are included in the model. Consequently, 
the model does not exhibit significant multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. 
Studentized residuals are used to identify outliers in the dependent variables. 
The models are tested with and without the outliers. No significant differences in the 
results are noted. The disclosure variables are also examined for potential outliers. 
The models are tested with and without the five most extreme values of the disclosure 
variables for both the US and UK samples. There are no significant differences in the 
model results with and without the extreme observations. The model results reported in 
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this study are based on models that include all of the discretionary disclosure 
observations. 
6.3 Test of Hypothesis 3: Discretionary Disclosure and Forecast Error 
The third research question addresses whether discretionary disclosure is 
related to differences in forecast error across the US and UK cross-listed firms. 
Equation (8) is estimated using ordinary least squares regression to determine whether 
discretionary disclosures explain differences in forecast error across US and UK cross-
listed firms. Table 9 presents the results for the model. The overall model is 
significant, with an Adjusted R-square of .328. Partial F-tests to check the significance 
of the control variables produced significant F-statistics for country, industry, forecast 
horizon, and firm size. These result indicate that these variables add to the explanatory 
power of the model. The significant F-statistic on the Country indicator variable 
indicates that mean forecast error across the US and UK firms is significantly different. 
Hypothesis 3 is tested by noting the significance of the estimated coefficients on 
Country i * VDS i,t-J and Country i * PVDS i,t-i· The variables produced F-statistics of 
14.911 and 41.036, both significant at the ~ .05 level of significance. These results 
indicate that the level and precision of discretionary disclosures explain differences in 
forecast error for the US and UK cross-listed firms, with the estimated effect of 
discretionary disclosures greater for the US firms. Therefore, null hypothesis 3 is 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. 7 
7 Joint tests of parameter stability, independence, and functional form indicate that the parameters are 
stable and the double-log model is an appropriate functional form. 
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Table 10 presents the estimated coefficients for the US and UK forecast error 
model. The results indicate that forecast error for UK cross-listed firms, assuming all 
other factors are constant, is 1.069 smaller than the forecast error for the US cross-
listed firms. Consistent with prior research, mean forecast error decreases as the 
. forecast horizon decreases. Specifically, mean forecast error is significantly larger for 
forecasts made eleven to four months prior to the firm's fiscal year end, relative to the 
mean forecast error of forecasts made the month of the firm's fiscal year end. 
For the industries represented in the study, the effect of industry classification 
on mean forecast error is different across the US and UK. The significant estimated 
coefficients on the interaction between the Country and Industry categorical variables 
indicates that the effect of industry classification on mean forecast error is different 
across the US and UK. This result may be due to differences in the number of analysts 
following particular industries across the US and UK. However, analyst following may 
not differ significantly across internationally listed firms. Perhaps differences in the 
economic environment across the US and UK contribute to differences in the industry 
affects across the two countries. That is, the operating environments of the industries 
may contribute to differences in earnings volatility. More stable economic 
environments, despite the number of analysts following the firm and the nature of 
competition in the industry, may result in less volatile earnings streams. 
The estimated effect of discretionary disclosure level on forecast error in the US 
is given by the coefficient on VOS. The estimated coefficient of -. 0946 indicates that 
discretionary disclosure levels by US cross-listed firms is negatively related to mean 
forecast error, assuming all other things are constant. In other words, as the number of 
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discretionary disclosures increases, mean forecast error decreases. The estimated 
coefficient for disclosure precision is .0618 and significant at alpha ::; .05. This result 
indicates that mean forecast error for the US cross-listed firms increases as 
discretionary disclosure precision increases. Diagnostic tests, e.g. , tests for 
. multicollinearity between the discretionary disclosure measures and the influence of 
extreme observations, are conducted to explain this result. The diagnostic tests indicate 
no multicollinearity problems. The model is also estimated excluding the five largest 
and smallest discretionary disclosure observations. The estimated coefficients are not 
influenced by excluding the extreme observations. Therefore, we are left with plausible 
explanations for the results observed. Plausible explanations for the US results include 
the following: First, analysts may disagree or distrust management's interpretation of 
factors that affect the firm's future performance, and therefore discount the firm's 
assessment of its future performance. Second, while management has a comparative 
advantage in firm-specific data gathering and analysis, this does not necessarily apply to 
industry and general economic trends that are expected to affect the firm's future 
operating performance. In other words, analysts may rely more heavily on their own 
assessments of the firm's future performance and independent forecasters of economic 
and industry trends [Jennings 1987]. 
The estimated effect of discretionary disclosure level on forecast error in the 
UK is given by the coefficient on VDS (-.0946) plus the estimated coefficient for 
Country*VDS (.156). The estimated coefficient of .p614 indicates that discretionary 
disclosure levels by UK cross-listed firms is positively related to mean forecast.error, 
assuming all other things are constant. In other words, as the number of discretionary 
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disclosures increases, mean forecast error for the UK firms increases. The estimated 
coefficient for disclosure precision is -.0712 (i.e., 0618 + -.133). This result indicates 
that mean forecast error for the UK cross-listed firms decreases as discretionary 
disclosure precision increases. Given that the discretionary disclosure precision 
.measure, which is based on the AICPA recommended disclosures, represents more 
informative disclosures, forecasts of UK cross-listed firms earnings are enhanced more 
precise disclosures, with precision as defined earlier in the study. 
Overall, the disclosure level and precision scores of the firms included in this 
study indicate that relatively few of the discretionary disclosures recommended by the 
AICPA and ICAEW are currently disclosed by US and UK cross-listed firms. 
Furthermore, the recommendation of increased discretionary disclosure to improve 
expectations is generally supported by the results in this study. However, there are 
questions regarding the relationship between discretionary disclosure precision and 
forecast error in the US. It appears that the relationship between discretionary 
disclosure and forecast error is country-specific, with discretionary disclosures 
explaining differences in forecast error across the US and UK cross-listed firms in the 
study. 
6.4 Test of Hypothesis 4: Discretionary Disclosure and Forecast Dispersion 
The fourth research question addresses .whether discretionary disclosure is 
related to differences in forecast dispersion across US and UK cross-listed firms. 
Equation (10) is estimated using ordinary least squares regression to test whether 
discretionary disclosure explains the variation in forecast dispersion across US and UK 
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cross-listed firms. Table 10 presents the results of the model. The overall model is 
significant with an Adjusted R-square of .530, indicating that the fitted model explains 
a significant portion of the variation in forecast dispersion, i.e., the level of agreement 
among analysts' forecasts. Partial F-tests to check the significance of the control 
. variables produced significant F-statistics for country, industry, forecast horizon, 
earnings stability, and firm size. 
Hypothesis 4 is tested by noting the significance of the estimated coefficients for 
Country i * VDS i,t-J and Country i * PVDS i,t-J· The variables produced F-statistics of 
5.606 and 36.633, both significant at the ~ .05 level of significance. These results 
indicate that the level and precision of discretionary disclosure explains differences in 
forecast dispersion for the US and UK cross-listed firms, with the estimated effect of 
discretionary disclosure greater for the US firms. Therefore, null hypothesis 4 is 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. 
Table 12 presents the estimated coefficients for the US and UK forecast 
dispersion model. Mean forecast dispersion is 1.021 greater for the UK cross-listed 
firms than for the US cross-listed firms. This result indicates that there is less 
consensus among analysts who forecast UK cross-listed firms' earnings. This result 
suggests- that the information sets of analysts who forecast UK cross-listed firms 
earnings differ more extensively than the information sets of analysts who forecast US 
cross-listed firms earnings. Differences in the information sets among analysts across 
the US and UK may reflect the cost and or availability of information.across the two 
countries. 
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Similar to the forecast error horizon, mean forecast dispersion or the level of 
disagreement among analysts decreases as the month in which the forecasts are made 
approaches the fiscal year end. This result is consistent across the US and UK firms. 
The estimated coefficient on VDS for the US cross-listed firms is -.0451, 
. indicating that forecast dispersion decreases as the level of discretionary disclosure 
increases. The estimated coefficient on PVDS for the US cross-listed firms is .0435, 
indicating that as discretionary disclosure precision increases, forecast dispersion 
increases. Again this result, which is consistent with the forecast error result, is 
counterintuitive. 
The estimated coefficient on VDS for the UK cross-listed firms is .0011 (i.e., 
-.0451 + .0462). The estimated coefficient is positive, but the magnitude of the effect 
is very small. This result is considered counterintuitive, as is the positive coefficient on 
disclosure precision for the US firms in the sample. The estimated coefficient on PVDS 
for the UK cross-listed firms is -.01765 (i.e., .0435 + -.06115), indicating that forecast 
dispersion decreases as the precision of discretionary disclosures increases. These 
results are consistent with the forecast error model results, which to some extent 
indicates the validity of the disclosure measures. 
In summary, the effect of discretionary disclosure appears to be different across 
the US and UK cross-listed firms in the study. Discretionary disclosure levels appear 
to be more useful in forecasting US firms' earnings, whereas disclosure precision 




The results of this study indicate that the US cross-listed firms provide more 
. discretionary disclosure than the UK cross-listed firms. This result refutes the 
contentions of Gray, Radebaugh, and Roberts (1990) that US firms will disclose less 
information voluntarily than UK firms because of the extensive mandatory disclosures 
in the US. Since US cross-listed firms provide more discretionary disclosure, perhaps 
other firm specific factors, e.g., firm size, the degree of leverage, ownership structure, 
industry concentration, and market concerns, determine firms' discretionary disclosure 
policies. 
Frost and Pownall (1994) posit that US cross-listed firms provide more 
discretionary disclosures than UK cross-listed firms because of US analysts' greater 
demand for information. A priori, UK cross-listed firms must meet similar demands 
for information and therefore may provide equivalent levels of disclosure. Analysts' 
following may contribute to the difference in disclosure across the US and UK cross-
listed firms. Cho (1994) finds that analyst following is significantly less for UK firms 
than for US firms. Assuming this result is applicable to US and UK cross-listed firms, 
UK cross-listed firms may not face the same demands for information; and therefore 
provide less disclosure on a voluntary basis. 
In light of the AICPA and ICAEW recommendations, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to examine whether discretionary disclosures explain the variation in 
forecast error and dispersion across the US and UK. The results of this study indicate 
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discretionary disclosures do in fact explain, at least in part, the variation in forecast 
error and dispersion across the US and UK cross-listed firms in the sample. Also, in 
light of the AICAP and ICAEW recommendation of increased discretionary disclosure 
to improve expectations, the relationship between discretionary disclosure and forecast 
. error and dispersion for the US and UK firms is examined. The results of this study 
indicate that the relationship between discretionary disclosure and analysts' forecast 
characteristics may be country-specific. For the US sample firms, contrary to a priori 
expectations, discretionary disclosure precision is positively related to forecast error 
and dispersion. However, discretionary disclosure level is negatively related to 
forecast error and dispersion. For the UK sample firms, discretionary disclosure 
precision is negatively related to forecast error and forecast dispersion. However, 
discretionary disclosure level is positively related to forecast. and dispersion. 
7 .1 Limitations 
First, this study does not consider the information disseminated by firms via 
disclosure media other than the annual financial report to shareholders or the SEC 10-K 
filing. For example, interim reports and press releases issued during the year are not 
considered in this study. Consequently, the discretionary disclosures included in the 
annual report do not represent a comprehensive examination of all discretionary 
disclosure. However, prior research suggests that firms' disclosure policies tend to be 
consistent across disclosure media [Lang and Lundholm 1993]. Therefore the level and 
precision of discretionary disclosure in the annual report should serve as a good proxy 
for discretionary disclosure across disclosure media [Botosan 1997]. 
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Second, the disclosure index does not include a complete list of discretionary 
disclosure possibilities. In the interest of objectivity and reliability, the index includes 
items that all firms could disclose. The list is reasonably complete to ensure variation 
in the level of disclosure. Also, to ensure an interval scale of measurement, this study 
. assumes that the disclosure items are equally weighted. The extent to which disclosure 
items are weighted differently by analysts, equal weighting of the disclosure items 
represents a limitation to the present study. 
Comparing the relationship between analyst forecasts and discretionary 
disclosure across countries requires adequate controls for differences in the flexibility 
of US and UK measurement practices. Appendix A summarizes significant differences 
in US and UK GAAP measurement techniques. To control for differences in the 
flexibility of US and UK accounting principles, an earnings stability measure is 
included in the regression model. The extent to which earnings stability does not proxy 
for differences in the flexibility of GAAP, or the ability to produce a less volatile 
earnings stream, differences in accounting principles is a significant limitation when 
comparing the effect of discretionary disclosure on analysts' forecasts in the US and 
the UK. 
7 .2 Future Research 
Examining disclosures by information type is a useful extension of the current 
study. The significance of discretionary disclosure may differ across discretionary 
disclosure types. For example, recent discussions on improving financial reporting 
emphasize forward-looking information [AICPA Special Committee on Financial 
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Reporting 1994]. Whether forward-looking information in particular improves 
analysts' forecasts remains an empirical question. 
The results reported in this dissertation indicate the importance of discretionary 
disclosure in reducing the level of disagreement among analysts. Future research on 
. individual analysts' forecasts may provide insights into whether forecast dispersion 
among analysts is the result of differences in their forecast models, information set, or 
expertise. 
Various theoretical disclosure models attempt to identify determinants of the 
discretionary disclosure decision. These models have identified factors that affect the 
disclosure decision and often predict conflicting disclosure policies. The development 
of empirical proxies for constructs identified in the disclosure models would be useful. 
These proxies may provide insight into the relative impact of the factors that affect the 
discretionary disclosure decision. 
Prior research has examined whether analysts' forecasts exhibit systematic bias, 
or whether analysts' forecasts incorporate all available information, including prior 
. forecast errors. Future research that examines forecast bias may be useful in assessing 
whether forecast error is associated with systematic forecast bias. In other words, 
forecast error may be due to analysts' incentives to provide optimistic forecasts. 
Systematic overstatement or understatement of firms' earnings may indicate that analyst 
forecasts are not rational expectations and do not incorporate all available information 
in an unbiased manner. 
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Appendix A 
Major Differences in US and UK Accounting Principles 
U.SMore UK More 
Conse1"Vative Consell'ative 
1. Asset valuation basis X 
2. Business Combinations X 
3. Consolidated Financial Statements X 
4. Accounting for Goodwill X 
5. Foreign Currency Translation X 
6. Inventory Valuation X 
7. Investment Properties X 
8. Capitalization of Interest Costs X 
9. Research and Development Expenditure X 
10. Capitalization of Computer Software X 
11. Intangible Assets. X 
12. Taxation Accounting X 
13. Extraordinary Items X 




Discretionary Disclosure Index 
I. Background Information 
1. Corporate goals or objectives 
2. Description of the business 
3. Principle products 
4. Principle markets 
· 5. Impact of industry structure on finn 
II. Financial and Nonfinancial Data 
6. Number of employees 
7. Average compensation per employee 
8. Market share 
9. Units sold 
10. Order backlog 
11. Selling prices 
12.. Quality of products or services 
13. Customer satisfaction 
14. Volume of materials consumed 
15. Prices of materials consumed 
16. New product development 
17. Employee turnover/employee satisfaction 
18. Average age of assets 
19. Ratio of outputs to inputs 
20. Employee productivity 
21. Efficiency measures 
22. Capacity measures 
23. Market locations 
24. Operating locations 
m. Management Discussion and Analysis 
Liquidity 
25. Each internal and external source of liquidity 
26. Events likely to result in a change in liquidity 
27. New Lines.of Credit 
28. Material Capital expenditures (effect on liquidity) 
29. Proposed sources of funds to satisfy capital expenditures 
30. Proposed sources of funding to satisfy contingencies 
31. For deficiencies course of action taken 
32. Material unused sources of liquid assets 
Results of Operations 
33. Significant economic changes that materially affect the amount of reported income from 
operations 
34. Extent to which income was affected 
35. Any significant components of revenues or expense 
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36. Known trends that will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or 
revenues or income from continuing operations 
37. Impact of inflation on net sales and revenues 
38. Impact of inflation on income from continuing operations 
39. Price change effects on net sales or revenues 
40. Price by segment 
41. Sales volume effects on net sales or revenues 
42. Volume by segment 
43. Net sales or revenue from introduction of new goods 
· 44. Demand 
Capital Resources 
45. Commitments for capital expenditures (use of capital resources) 
46. Source of funds for commitments 
47. Trends, favorable or unfavorable, in capital resources 
48. Trends in expenditures of funds 
49. Equity, debt and off-balance sheet financing arrangement 
Anticipatory Information 
Liquidity: 
50. Anticipated trends likely to result in a change in liquidity 
51. Proposed sources of funding to satisfy anticipated trends 
Results of Operations: 
52. Anticipated trends with future material impact on revenues 
53. Anticipated trends with future material impact on income from continuing operations 
Capital Resources: 
54. Anticipated trends in sources of funds 
55. Anticipated trends in expenditures of funds 




59. Market share 
60. Cash flow 
61. Capital expenditures and/or R&D expenditure forecast 
IV. Forward-looking Information 
Opportunities and Risks 
62. Threat from substitute products or services 
63. Bargaining power of customers, suppliers, or employees 
64. Nature of competitive environment 
65. Risks from participating in additional industries 
66. . Risks from concentrations in assets, customers, or suppliers 
67. Key management assumptions 
68. Comparison of actual business performance to previously disclosed opportunities, risks, 
and management's plans 
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. 2. Does the firm disclose the change in the item? 
3. Does the firm discuss causes or reasons for the item (i.e. does the firm link the item disclosed 
with business decisions/event affecting the item? 
4. Does the firm quantify causes or reasons for the item? 
5. Does the firm discuss any transitory or permanent effects of the item disclosed? 




Economic Predictor Variables 
The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate the relationship between actual changes in 
earnings and forecasts of economic factors. If actual changes in earnings are related to actual or 
expected changes in economic predictor variables, errors in economic forecasts are expected to be 
correlated with analysts' earnings forecast errors since analysts include economic forecasts in their 
earnings forecast model. Herrmann (1996) describes expected changes in earnings as a function of 
expected changes in economic factors. The model is described as follows: 
E[Xi,t+i1 = f(X,_;,E[dGNP,+1],E[AFX,+1],E[MNF,+1] (13) 
where 
E[Xj,1+11 = the expected value of firm J earnings in period t+ 1 
xj,,-i = firm j earnings in period t - i 
E[L\FX1+1] = expected change in exchange rates from period t to t + 1. 
E[MNF,+1] = expected change in inflation from period t to t + 1 
E[dGNP,+1] = expected change in real GNP from period t to t + 1. 
Consistent with Herrmann (1996), analysts use forecasts of changes in exchange rates, 
inflation, and GNP to forecast firms' earnings. The intuition is that a firm's operating performance 
iS directly correlated with the economic activity of the country in which it operates. 
O'Brien (1989) suggests that forecast errors may be due to unexpected changes in 
economic factors. Because of data limitations, the economic factors are not included in the forecast 
error ( dispersion) model. . However, to determine whether analyst forecast errors may be correlated 
with unexpected changes in any of the economic factors, actual changes in earnings are regressed 
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on actual and expected changes in the economic factors. If the change in earnings is correlated 
with actual or expected changes in the economic factors, unexpected changes in the economic 
factors may be correlated with forecast errors. 
},fodelSpeciji,cation 
One-year- ahead regression forecast models described in BHS [1990] and Herrmann 
[1996] are used to test whether expected changes in macroeconomic factors are useful in predicting 
changes in earnings. The model of economic forecast variables is first run assuming perfect 
foresight of the changes in economic factors. The model is run a second time to allow for errors in 
the economic forecasts. The following equation is estimated for the years 1991 to 1996. 
lnYi1+1 - lnYi, = ao + P1(Expfx,+1) + P2CE.xpinf,+1) + P3(EgnP,+1)+ P4(Expfx1+1 *·Expinf,+1)+ 
Ps(Expfx,+1 *Expgnp,+1)+ P6(Expinf,+1*Expgnp,+1)+ P,(Expfx1+1 *Expinf,+1*Expgnp1+1)+e (8 
where 
yjt+l = the actual value of earnings of firm j in period t + 1 
Yi, = the actual value of earnings of firm j in period t 
Expfx,+1 = the expected change in real effective exchange rates from period t 
to period t+ 1 
Expinf,+1 = the expected change in inflation from period t to period t + 1 
Expgnpt+I = the expected change in GNP from period t to period t + 1 
The next section discusses the economic forecast variables and the data sources for the 
variables. 
Economic Factors 
Actual and expected changes in real GNP (GDP for UK firms) and inflation (GNP 
deflators) are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook for the years 1991 to 1996. The 
forecasts of real GNP (nominal GNP adjusted for inflation), and inflation are based on the 
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economic forecasters assessment of the world economy, drawing on UK and US general economic 
and area analyses. In light of the economic and market relationships among countries, forecasts of 
national economic developments account for the international trade and financial linkages among 
countries. 
The actual changes in the real effective exchange rate for the US were obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics. The exchange rates are defined broadly as a real effective 
exchange rate index, i.e. an exchange rate adjusted for relative movements in national price or cost· 
indicators of the home country and its partner or competitor countries. [International Financial 
Statistics, October 1994]. As suggested by BHS (1990) and Herrmann (1996), a random walk 
model for expected changes in exchange rates is used to test the relationship between changes in 
actual earnings and changes in expected exchange rates. 
As noted previously, equation (8) is also estimated assuming perfect foresight and actual 
changes in the economic predictor variables are regressed on the actual changes in earnings. The 
model results are presented in the accompanying tables in this appendix. The results indicate that 
actual changes, as well as expected changes in economic factors are not related to changes in 
•, 
earnings. Therefore, the none of the economic predictor variables are included in the forecast error 
( dispersion) model presented in this study. 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Forecast Error Model of Economic Predictor Variables: 
Assuming Perfect Foresight 
ln"Yi.,+1 - ln"Yi., = a0 + Countryi + biActfx + b~ctinf + b,Actgnp + b,,A.ctfx*Actinf 
+by4cifx*Actgnp +be'fctinf*Actgnp + b.,A.ctfx*Actinf*Actgnp + e 
Dependent variable: ln"Yi.,+1 - ln"Yi., 
COUNTRY N 
UK(UK = 0) 326 
U.S. (U.S. = 1) 321 
F Significance level 
Intercept .005 .944 
Country 1.630 .202 
Actfx 1.258 .262 
Actinf .001 .973 
Actgnp .262 .609 
Actfx* Actinf 1.221 .270 
Actfx * Actgnp .644 .423 
Actinf* Actgnp 2.093 .148 
Actfx * Actinf* Actgnp .089 .766 
R Squared = .069 (Adjusted R Squared = .058) 
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Appendix D (continued) 
Forecast Error Model of Economic Predictor Variables 
ln~.,+1 - In~., = a0 + Countryi + b1Expfx + biEx,pinf + b3Expgnp + b~pfx*Expinf 
+ bsExpfx*Expgnp + btftxpinf*Expgnp + b~pfx*Expgnp*Expinf + e 
Dependent variable: ln~.,+1 - In~., 
COUNTRY N 
UK (UK= 0) 326 
U.S. (U.S. = 1) 321 
F Significance level 
Intercept .093 .760 
Country 1.120 .290 
Expfx .258 .612 
Exp inf .473 .492 
Expgnp .029 .865 
Expfx*Expinf .130 .718 
Expfx*Expgnp .133 .716 
Expinf*Expgnp .516 .473 
Expfx *Expgn*Expinf .006 .939 
R Square = .073 (Adjusted R Square = .062) 
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Table 1 
Number of Firms in Sample 
us UK 
Cross-listed firms from 1994 International Stock Exchange 218 169 
Less: Firms with no I/B/E/S data (129) (89) 
Less: Firms with no annual report data available (12) (6) 
Less: Financial institutions (6) (3) 
Less: Number of firms with stock splits for the years 1993 or 1995 
(0) (0) 
Total number of firms in sample 71 71 
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Table 2 
Sector classifications and sector codes 
Classification Code us UK 
Insurance 01 10 6 
Health Care 02 5 6 
Consumer Nondurables 03 5 9 
Consumer Services 04 3 19 
Consumer Durables 05 7 0 
Energy 06 4 5 
Transportation 07 2 1 
Technology 08 8 3 
Building and Related Materials 09 8 5 
Merchandising 10 9 9 
Public Utilities 11 10 8 
Total Firms 71 71 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics for tests of differences for US and UK discretionary Disclosure 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Std. Mean Sig. 
Country N Mean Deviation Difference t (2-tailed) 
VOS 
UK 96 12.9688 4.2660 
us 97 16.5979 4.9152 -3.6292 -5.480 .000 
· PVDS 
UK 96 14.0885 7.4360 
us 97 18.7567 8.4249 -4.6682 -4.082 .000 
64 
Table 4 
Summary statistics for tests of differences for the years 1993 and 1995 
Panel A: US Firms Sampled 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Std. Mean Sig. 
YEAR N Mean Deviation Difference t (2-tailed) 
VDS 
1993 45 15.4444 3.9918 
1995 51 17.5882 5.4888 -2.1438 -2.206 .030 
PVDS 
1993 45 17.4311 7.0016 
1995 51 19.9216 9.4960 -2.4905 -1.473 .144 
Panel B: U.K. Firms Sampled 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Std. Mean Sig. 
YEAR N Mean Deviation Difference t (2-tailed) 
VDS 
1993 44 11.9773 3.9912 
1995 52 13.8077 4.3478 -1.8304 -2.149 .034 
PVDS 
1993 44 12.1818 6.1683 
1995 52 15.7019 8.0703 -3.5201 -2.419 .017 
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Table 5 
Correlation Statistics for US Forecast Error Model 
LnError VOS PVOS LnEarn LnSIZE 
LnError 1.000 -.091 * -.016 .033 -.394* 
VOS 1.000 .834* -.091* .144* 
PVDS 1.000 -.026 .217* 
LnEarn 1.000 -.031 
LnSize 1.000 
*Significant at the alpha ~ .05 level 
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Table 6 
Correlation Statistics for UK Forecast Error Model 
LnError VDS PVDS LnEam LnSize 
LnError 1.000 -.084 -.171 * .152* -.248* 
VDS 1.000 .641* -.018 .160* 
PVDS 1.000 -.131 * .173* 
LnEam 1.000 .058 
LnSize 1.000 
*Significant at the alpha :S: .05 level 
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Table 7 


























































US and UK Forecast Error Model 
LnFEj,i = Clo + 131 VDSj,1.1 + PzPVDSj,t-i + J3llnEarn_;,1.s + l34lnSizej,t + 13,Country 
+ ~oilndij,1 + ~yiHorij,1 + ~ Year + !lJCountry*VDSj,1-1 + 13sCountry*PVDSj,,-1 
+ j3gCountry * lnEarn,;,1•5 + l310Country*lnSizej,, + (311Country*~ilndij,1 
+ l312Country* ~yiHorij,t + l313Country*Year + e 
Variable df F 
Corrected Model 50 10.637** 
Intercept 1 40.573** 
VDS 1 .661 
PVDS 1 .194 
LnEam l .591** 
LnSize 1 56.564** 
Country 1 4.258** 
Ind 10 9.093** 
Hor 11 4.869** 
Year 1 .327 
Country * VDS 1 14.911** 
Country * PVDS 1 41.036** 
Country * LnEam 1 6.374** 
Country * LnSize 1 37.615** 
Country * Ind 8 8.882** 
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Table 9 (continued) 
US and UK Forecast Error Model 
LnFEj,t = Clo + !31 VDSj,t-t + !3iPVDSj,t-t + 13.JlnEarn;,1.s + l34lnSizej,t + 13sCountry 
+ I:6ilndij,i + I:yiHorij,i + ~Year + (},Country*VDSj,i-t + l3sCountry*PVDSj,1-1 
+ j3gCountry*lnEarnj,i-s + l310Country*lnSizej,t + l311Country*I:6ilndij,1 
+ 1312Country* I:yiHorij,t + l313Country*Year + e 
Variable df F 
Country * Hor 10 .573 
Country * Year 1 2.857 
Error 937 
Total 988 
Corrected Total 987 
Adjusted R Squared = .328 
**Significant at alpha ~ .05 
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Table 10 
Estimated Coefficients for the US and UK Forecast Error Model 
LnFEj,l = Clo + 13, vosj,t-1 + l3zPVDSj,l-l + '3:ilnEarn,;,1-S + l34lnSizej,l + l3sCountry 
+ I:oilndij,t + I:yiHorij,t + ~ Year + ~Country*VDSj,t-t + l3sCountry*PVDSj,t-t 
+ j3gCountry*lnEarn,;,1-s + 13ioCountry*lnSizej,t + l311Country*I:oilndij,i 
+ l312Country* I:yiHorij,t + 13,3Country*Y ear + e 
Predictor Variable B Std. Error t statistic 
Intercept -.918 .. 400 -2.296** 
VOS -.0946 .023 -4.168** 
PVDS .0618 .013 4.805** 
LnEarn -.6804 .060 -1.131 
LnSize -.532 .041 -12.814** 
Country -1.069 .700 -1.528 
Ind 01 -.497 .224 -2.219** 
lnd02 -1.304 .268 -4.859** 
Ind 03 -1.058 -.200 -5.302** 
Ind04 -.402 .296 -1.358 
Ind 05 -.999 .228 -4.386** 
Ind 06 -.415 .266 -1.563 
lnd07 -1.485 .329 -4.521 ** 
lnd09 -.552 .253 -2.179** 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Estimated Coefficients for the US and UK Forecast Error Model 
LnFEj,l = <lo + 131 vosj,l-1 + !3iPVDSj,1-l + '33lnEanl_j,1-S + l34lnSizej,1 + l3sCountry 
+ :Eoilndij,1 + :EyiHorij,1 + 136 Year + ~Country*VDSJ,i-a + J3sCountry*PVDSJ,i-a 
+ (3gCountry*lnEanl_j,1.5 + l310Country*lnSizeJ,i + l311Country*:E6ilndij,i 
+ 1312Country* I:yiHorij,i + l313Country*Year + E 
Predictor Variable J3 Std. Error t statistic 
Ind 10 -.315 .211 -1.496 
Hor= -11 1.463 .429 3.410** 
Hor= -10 1.127 .239 4.710** 
Hor= -09 1.095 .236 4.635** 
Hor= -08 .978 .235 4.153** 
Hor= -07 .885 .238 3.718** 
Hor= -06 .738 .239 3.087** 
Hor= -05 .483 .238 2.029** 
Hor= -04 .428 .239 1.790 
Hor= -03 .228 .237 .960 
Hor= -02 .178 .237 .750 
Hor= -01 .159 .242 .656 
Year -.276 .128 -2.159** 
Country * VOS .156 .040 3.861 ** 
Country * PVDS -.133 .021 -6.406*~ 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Estimated Coefficients for the US and UK Forecast Error Model 
LnFEj,t = <Xo + J31 VDSj,i-i + f3.iPVDSj,i-i + 13JlnEa1'Dj,1.5 + J34lnSizej,t + (3,Country 
+ roiindij,t + ryiHorij,t + J36 Year + 13JCountry*VDSj,i-i + J38Country*PVDSj,i-i 
+ ~Country*lnEa1'Dj,1•5 + J310Country*lnSizej,i + J311Country*roiindij,i 
+ J312Country* ryiHorij,t + J313Country*Year + E 
Predictor Variable J3 Std. Error t statistic 
Country * lnEam .196 .078 2.525** 
Country * lnSize .478 .078 6.133** 
Country * Ind O 1 -1.300 .485 -2.683** 
Country * Ind 02 -.07923 .512 -.155 
Country * Ind 03 -1.019 .459 -2.220** 
Country * Ind 04 -1.731 .504 -3.438** 
Country * Ind 07 1.413 .686 2.061** 
Country * Ind 09 .528 .502 1.051 
Country * Ind 10 -.874 .520 -1.681 
Country * Ind 11 .968 .491 1.973** 
Country * Year .413 .244 1.690 
**Significant at alpha S .05 
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Table 11 
US and UK Forecast Dispersion Model 
LnCVj,t = a 0 + l31VOSj,t-t + (3.zPVOSj,t-i + '3JlnEamj,t-s + j34lnSizej,t + j35Country 
+ I:oiindij,t + I:yiHorij,t + 136 Year + 13-,Country*VOSj,t-I + j38Country*PVOSj,i-• 
+ j3gCountry*lnEa111;,,-s + l310Country*lnSizej,i + l311Country*I:o;Indij,, 
+ l312Country* I:yiHorij,t + j313Country*Y ear + E 
Source df F 
Corrected Model 50 23.390** 
Intercept 1 123.445** 
VOS 1 5.208** 
PVOS 1 6.548** 
LnEam 1 7.191** 
LnSize 1 33.221 ** 
Country 1 4.970** 
Ind 10 32.742** 
Year 1 .430 
Country * VOS 1 5.606** 
Country * PVOS 1 36.633** 
Country * LnEam 1 25.612** 
Country * LnSize 1 44.863** 
Country * Ind 8 5.254** 
Country * Hor 10 .917 
Country * Year 1 .029 
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Table 11 (continued) 
US and UK Forecast Dispersion Model 
LnCVj,1 = · ao + b1 VDSj,1-1 + b2PVDSj,t-l + b3lnEamj,i-s + b4lnSizej,t + b5Country 
+ EBilndij,t + EyiHorij,t + b6 Year + b,Country*VDSj,i-i + b8Country*PVDSj,t-i 
+ b9Country*lnEamj,i-s + b10Country*lnSizej,t + b11Country*EBilndij,t 
+ b12Country* EyiHorij,i + b13Country*Year + s 
Source df F 
Error 942 
Total 993 
Corrected Total 992 
Adjusted R Square = .530 
**Significant at alpha S .05 
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Table 12 
Estimated Coefficients for the US and UK Forecast Dispersion Model 
LnCVj,t = a.0 + 131 VDSj,t-i + l3iPVDSj,t-1 + '3llnEamj,t-s + l34lnSizej,t + l35Country 
+ :ES;Ind;j,t + :Ey;Hori,j,t + 136 Year + 13,Country*VDSi,t-i + l38Country*PVDSj,i-i 
+ j3gCountry*lnEamj,i-s + l310COW1try*lnSizej,t + 13uCountry*:ES;In~j.t 
+ l312Country* :EyiHorij,t + l313Country*Year + E 
Predictor Variable 13 Std. Error t statistic 
Intercept 1.351 .194 6.965** 
VDS -.0451 .011 -4.183** 
PVDS .0435 .006 6.980** 
LnEam .145 .029 5.030** 
LnSize -.260 .020 -12.998** 
Country 1.021 .355 2.875** 
Ind 01 -.329 .110 -2.991 ** 
-1.216 .125 -9.742** 
Ind 02 
Ind 03 -1.024 .097 -10.592** 
Ind 04 -.540 .143 -3.791 ** 
Ind 05 -.394 .111 -3.540** 
Ind 06· .435 .129 3.384** 
Ind 07 .09218 .154 -.599 
Ind 09 .192 .125 1.545 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Estimated Coefficients for the US and UK Forecast Dispersion Model 
LnCVj,1 = ao + 131 VDSj,1-1 + fJiPVDSj,1-1 + ~lnEaf°:i,1-s + l34lnSizej,1 + l35Country 
+ 1:6ilndij,t + 1:yiHorij,t + 136 Year + f37Country*VDSj,t-t + f3sCountry*PVDSj,t-i 
+ f3gCountry*lnEanlj,1_5 + l310COIDltry*lnSizej,t + l311Country*l:6ilndij,t 
+ 13,2Country* l:yiHorij,1 + l313Country*Y ear + e 
Predictor Variable 13 Std_ Error t statistic 
Ind 10 -.545 .101 -5.368** 
Hor= -11 .679 .205 3.315** 
Hor= -10 .630 .113 5.548** 
Hor= -09 .620 .112 5.559** 
Hor= -08 .611 .112 5.473** 
Hor= -07 .534 .113 4.725** 
Hor= -06 .485 .112 4.310** 
Hor= -05 .417 .113 3.692** 
Hor= -04 .347 .113 3.076** 
Hor= -03 .298 .113 2.641** 
Hor= -02 .173 .113 1.528 
Hor= -01 .0703 .112 .625 
Year .04885 .061 .799 
Country * VOS .04624 .020 2.368** 
Country * PVDS -.06115 .010 -6.052** 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Estimated Coefficients for the US and UK Forecast Dispersion Model 
LnCV;,1 = CXo + 131 VDS;,1.1 + f}zPVDS;,1.1 + '33lnEa111;,1.s + l34lnSize;,1 + l3sCountry 
+ :Eoiln~j.i + l:yiHorij,1 + 136 Year + 13JCountry*VDS;,1.1 + l38Country*PVDS;,i-1 
+ f3gCountry*lnEa111;,1.s + l310Country*lnSize;,1 + l311Country*l:6ilndij,i 
+ l312Country* l:yiHorij.t + l313Country*Y ear + & 
Predictor Variable 13 Std. Error t statistic 
Country * lnEam -.190 .038 -5.061 ** 
Country * lnSize .279 .042 6.698** 
Country * Ind O 1 -.332 .238 -1.399 
Country * Ind 02 .530 ... .252 2.108** 
Country * Ind 03 . 05899 .231 .255 
Country * Ind 04 -.696 .253 -2.752** 
Country * Ind 07 .007401 .345 .021 
Country * Ind 09 -.101 .251 -.403 
Country * Ind 10 .07406 .258 .287 
Country * Ind 11 -.269 .274 -.985 
Country * Year .0202 .118 -.171 
**Significant at alpha ~ .05 
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Figure 1 
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Source: Martin Walker, (1997). The Economics of Co,porate Financial Communication. Association of 
Chartered Certified Accountants, Occasional Research Paper No. 19, p. 7. 
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